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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ' 
vs. 
JOSEPH MORGAN, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
) Case No. 
13451 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE 
OF THE CASE 
The State of Utah, appellant, appeals 
the resentencing of respondent, Joseph Morgan, 
by the Third Judicial District Court, Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Stewart M. Hanson, Judge, presiding. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Joseph Morgan was resentenced on August 
3, 1973, to the crime of simple possession of 
a controlled substance with a term of six 
months in the Salt Lake County Jail by the 
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Judge. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmance of Judge 
Hanson's decision in the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent accepts the statement of 
facts as set forth in Appellant's Brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WHEN A PERSON IS FOUND GUILTY OF AIDING 
AND ABETTING A CRIME, WHICH IS LATER' 
ESTABLISHED NOT TO HAVE OCCURRED, SUCH 
CONVICTION MUST BE SET ASIDE. 
At the outset it should be noted that 
the defendant is in agreement with the general 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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statement made by the appellant to the effect 
that there need not be an actual conviction 
of a principal to a crime in order for another 
person to be found guilty of that same crime 
on the theory that he aided and abetted. How-
ever, this statement is manifestly opposite 
of defendant's position that in order for a 
conviction of aiding and abetting a crime to 
stand, that crime must have in fact been 
committed. 
In our fact situation the crime with 
which defendant was charged with, aiding and 
abetting, was unlawful possession of a cont-
trolled substance with intent to distribute 
for value. The only person who could be the 
principal was the defendant's wife, Mrs. Morgai 
who was arrested with the controlled substance 
She is the only person who could have committee 
that crime. However, she was found not guilty 
of the crime charged; but guilty of possession 
only. As the Colorado Supreme Court stated in 
Britto v. People, 497 P. 2d 325 (1972) (cited 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in appellant's brief) 
"to successfully convict a defendant 
of being an accessory there must be 
sufficient evidence presented to show 
that there was, in fact, a principal 
who was guilty of the crime charged. 
(Emphasis added.) 
If it has been determined that Mrs. 
Morgan did not commit the crime of possession 
with intent to distribute for value, there 
can be no guilty principal. 
A similar situation was addressed by the 
U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
in U. S. v. Prince, 430 F. 2d 1324 (1970). 
In that case, Prince was charged with aiding 
and abetting the taking of a bird while a boat 
was being operated by a motor. The evidence 
was that while Prince operated the boat, his 
companion stood in the bow and shot the bird. 
Prince was found guilty and appealed. While 
the appeal was in progress, his companion was 
tried and acquitted. His acquittal establishec 
that no crime had been committed. The court 
said: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"Since only the two men were in 
the boat, Prince could have been 
aiding and abetting no other person. 
In Meredith v. U. S. 238 F. 2d 535, 
542 (1956), in considering the guilt 
of an aider and abetter we said, fIt 
need only be established that the act 
constituting the offense was in fact 
committed by someone.1 (Citations 
ommitted). Here, since it has been 
established that the act constituting 
the offense was not committed, Prince's 
conviction as an aider and abetter must 
be set aside." at 1325. 
Since in the present case the court 
found that Mrs. Morgan had no intent to 
distribute for value, Mr. Morgan could not 
be found guilty of aiding and abetting an 
offense which never occurred. 
Further support for defendant's position 
is found in Shu111esworth v. City of Birming-
ham, 373 U. S. 262, 83 S. Ct. 1130, 10 L. Ed 
2d 335 (1963). In that case, the petitioners 
were convicted for aiding and abetting a vio-
lator of the city trespass ordinance. The 
conviction of the principals of the trespass 
violation was set aside. The Supreme Court 
in setting aside the conviction of the aiders 
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and abetters said: 
" . . . Since the convictions in Gabel 
v
- Birmingham (the principals) have 
been set aside, it follows that the 
present petitioners did not incite, 
or aid and abet any crime, and that, 
therefore, their own convictions must 
be set aside." at 265. 
The appellant cites State v. Spillman,, 
468 P. 2d 376 in support of its position. 
That case can be distinguished from the present 
one. In Spillman the court said: 
" . . . What is required at the trial 
of the aider and abetter is proof, 
complete and convincing of the guilt 
of the principal. Justice demands that 
the principal crime be fully proved, since 
the guilt of the aider and abetter 
depends on the commission of the 
principal crime." at 378. 
I n
 Spillman the crime charged was rape. 
Under the court's ruling quoted above, the 
State would be forced 'to prove that (1) the 
crime of rape was committed and (2) committed 
by a person whom the defendant aided and abette 
If a person charged as the principal was later 
acquitted, it means that that person did not 
commit the rape. However, it does not mean Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that no rape was committed. Someone else 
raped the woman and the defendant in Spillmari 
can be found guilty of aiding and abetting 
•as 
that person. 
In the present case there is no question 
that the principal and only the principal was 
in possession of the controlled substance. 
Thus, she was the only one who could commit 
the crime. However, in order to be guilty of 
the principal crime, she had to have a specific 
intent, i.e. to distribute for value. It was 
found that she did not have that specific inter 
and thus unlike Spillman, supra, no principal 
crime was committed. Therefore, even under the 
law of the Spillman case, Mr. Morgan could not 
be found guilty of aiding and abetting a crime 
which was not committed. 
POINT II 
THE RESENTENCING COURT HAD JURISDICTION 
TO RESENTENCE THE RESPONDENT. 
At the time Mr. Morgan file his appeal 
the issue he presented to Judge Hanson was not 
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present. The issue did not become ripe until 
Mrs. Morgan was acquitted. The issue now bein< 
presented was not a "claimed error or defect" 
which occurred at trial,but;was a defect which 
arose after trial and went to the very essence 
of the judgment. An amended brief would have 
done no good whatsoever, because the issue 
which would have been raised by such a brief 
would not have been one of the points which 
were on appeal. 
Judge Hanson did not act as a reviewing 
court but merely corrected what he felt was 
a wrongly entered judgment, based on an event 
which occurred subsequent to trial. 
If the filing of an appeal by Mr. Morgan 
vested jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, it 
is defendant's position that the District Cour-
retained the power to act as it did, because 
its actions did not affect or touch any of the 
issues appealed to the Utah Supreme Court. 
4A C.J.S. 607 states the following rule: 
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"the perfection of an appellate 
proceeding does not, however deprive 
the trial court of power to act with 
reference to matters not relating to 
the subject matter of, or affecting 
the proceeding." at 397. 
The ruling of Judge Hanson neither delt 
with the subject matter of the appeal, i.e. 
errors occurring at trial, nor did it affect 
the proceeding. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant urges that in light of the 
arguments presented above r^ia|t the Decision 
of Judge Hanson be affirm^ 
ted, 
ROBERT VAN SCIVER 
Attorney for Defendant-
Respondent 
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